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Teaching to the Paradoxes: 
Human Rights Practice in U.S. Law School 
Clinics 
 
DEENA R. HURWITZ* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
I think most would agree that there is no single paradigm for 
human rights clinics. They are diverse and, like human rights 
advocacy itself, innovative and context specific. As the Re-imagining 
International Clinical Law Symposium (Symposium) organizers 
point out, international human rights clinics share the  
[U]ndergirding principle that globalization both changes the 
law and is in turn changed by it, an assumption that 
challenges traditional notions of state sovereignty and the 
salience of domestic legal regimes, and acknowledges the 
resulting transnationalization of legal, political, and 
economic systems and the generation of new global 
institutions.1   
International human rights clinics have to navigate the 
substantial tensions in the law itself. International law is 
simultaneously orthodox and innovative, a paradox that, in fact, 
challenges legal education on the whole. Law students should 
graduate knowing not only the ―black letter‖ norms and principles but 
also being able to critique the rules and anticipate changes in the 
field. International human rights law (IHRL) is intrinsically evolving, 
 
       *  Associate Professor and Director, International Human Rights Law Clinic 
and Human Rights Program, University of Virginia School of Law. J.D., 
Northeastern University School of Law. I thank the Symposium organizers, the 
Maryland Journal of International Law (MJIL) and Professors Peter Danchin, 
Barbara Olshansky, and Michael Millemann, for their stimulating and insightful 
guidance in framing the conversations. Thanks are also due to the editors of MJIL, 
especially Emily Siedell, for their patience in bringing this article to publication. 
 1. Panel Themes/Guidance Questions, Re-imagining International Clinical 
Law Symposium, Maryland Journal of International Law (on file with author). 
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and even as it evolves, it must constantly justify its efficacy by re-
asserting its foundational tenets. 
II.  THE VALUE OF CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY AND CRITICAL 
THINKING  
Conventional legal education trains lawyers rationally to apply 
law to facts as a neutral process. For decades, critical legal theorists 
have censured the doctrinal method taught at law schools for failing 
to probe ―the social, economic, and political conditions underpinning 
legal doctrine, legal process, and particular legal results.‖2 
Consequently, little space is devoted to discussion about the role of 
values, voices, emotions, and political choices—in both legal process 
and substantive outcomes.3 Fundamentally, clinical legal education 
asserts that the law is not neutral; it teaches students to read between 
the lines of legal doctrine and look for the multiple stories that lie 
within. Clinical legal education subscribes to the principle that 
lawyers have an ethical obligation to use the law for the betterment of 
society. It aims to impart a sense of professional responsibility for 
social justice, to expose students to methods and skills, and to 
provide opportunities for them to practice using the law for social 
change.  
Nowhere is this more true than in the realm of international 
human rights, with all its contradictions, and where the line between 
law and politics is often blurred. The paradox of orthodoxy and 
innovation that I invoke underscores the value of critical thinking as 
context, skill, strategy, and goal of international clinical education. 
Professor Balakrishnan Rajagopal writes that human rights is an 
essentially conservative discourse, but, by examining the 
―historiography‖ (history and context), we can easily uncover the 
multiple competing universalisms underlying the discourse that are 
part of and result from globalization.4  The compartmentalization of 
rights into ―generations,‖ for example, can be understood not as a 
hierarchy of values or a statement of legitimacy, but as an artifact of 
the priorities established by sovereign States and international 
 
 2. Janet Mosher, Legal Education: Nemesis or Ally of Social Movements?, 35 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 613, 624–25 (1997) (cf. Karl Klare, The Law Curriculum in 
the 1980s: What’s Left?, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 336, 366 (1982)).   
 3. Id. at 624.  
 4. See generally BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM 
BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 
(2003).  
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institutions for human rights protection, fulfillment, and 
enforcement.5   
Human rights practice spans the gulf between the orthodox and 
the innovative. It inevitably works within and between both realms, 
and clinics have the challenge of teaching on the continuum from one 
extreme to the other. What is more, students enroll in international 
human rights clinics with vastly different expectations and 
experiences. Some are eager to engage the field of contestation; 
others subscribe to ―sovereigntism‖6 and the orthodox view of human 
rights.  
Many U.S. law students are baffled, if not altogether skeptical, 
about human rights practice and enforcement. Human rights 
lawyering benefits from a solid foundation in the traditional sources 
of international law and, especially, an understanding of customary 
international law. Using Article 38 of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) Statute as a point of departure,7 my students and I 
 
 5. Id. at 216. Human rights were conceived first in negative and individualist 
terms—civil and political rights govern what States must not do to individuals. 
Juxtaposed against obligations of immediate effect, progressive realization refers to 
what States should (N.B., not shall) do gradually to fulfill their obligations for 
economic, social, and cultural rights according to their narrowly determined means. 
Even when collective rights (e.g., self-determination) were introduced, they were 
required to conform to the traditional principle of the territorial integrity of States 
and to steer clear of economic self-determination. Id. at 247; cf. Deena R. Hurwitz, 
Book Review, The Politics of the People, Human Rights, and What Is Hidden From 
View, 37 GEO. WASH. INT‘L L. REV. 293, 297 (2005). 
 6. D.A. Jeremy Telman, Plural Vision: International Law Seen Through the 
Varied Lenses of Domestic Implementation, 44 VAL. L. REV. 759, 763 (2010); see 
Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and 
Holland, 73 MO. L. REV. 1105, 1113–14 (2008) (defining sovereigntism as ―a 
position insistent on a nation‘s right to define and delineate its own lawmaking‖); 
Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 649, 654 & n.16 (2002) (characterizing sovereigntism as ―grounded in a 
general skepticism of international law and international lawmaking processes‖). 
 7. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1), lays out the 
sources of international law:  
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
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discuss the process through which human rights principles, such as 
the prohibition of enforced disappearance or the rights of indigenous 
peoples to free, prior, and informed consent, crystallize into custom 
and codification.8 This grounds our clinic work in the theoretical, 
provides a comprehensible continuum for students to move beyond 
the traditional, and gives them a foundation for human rights 
research. 
III.  BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME—INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC LAW 
One of the core characteristics that distinguishes human rights 
clinics from other public interest clinics is, first and foremost, the 
application of the international legal framework. Yet, international 
human rights law clinics find fertile ground in the convergence of 
international law and domestic law. Students learn to draw on 
multiple and often intersecting jurisdictional regimes in addition to 
international and human rights law, e.g., constitutional and other 
national law, international humanitarian law, religious law, 
indigenous law, and custom. 
Important learning opportunities spring from the tensions and 
critical developments in the field. The relationship of international 
law and national law is an interesting case in point. States that are 
monist incorporate international law directly into domestic law; they 
recognize no distinction between the two legal regimes. In this 
context, international law can be relied upon by individuals and 
applied by judges in court. However academic this may seem, law 
 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.  
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), Apr. 18, 1946, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3deb4b9c0.html; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702, reporters‘ notes (1987).  
 8. See, e.g., Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to 
Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT‘L L. 757 (2001); 
Office of the U.N. High Comm‘r for Human Rights, Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, Fact Sheet No. 6/Rev.3 at 5–10 (2009), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet6Rev3.pdf; S. JAMES 
ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2004); Seth 
Korman, Indigenous Ancestral Lands and Customary International Law, 32 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 391 (2010); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 702 cmts. d–m, reporters‘ notes (1987). 
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students should be aware that domestic law is more accommodating 
in some legal systems than in others.  
The status of international human rights norms in the domestic 
legal hierarchy is an important matter. In the purest form of monism, 
international law is superior to conflicting national law, even if 
entered into after the national law was enacted. In some monist 
countries, Colombia for example, international human rights 
contained in duly ratified treaties have a legal ranking similar to the 
Constitution.9  
Both groups of rights must be complementary and mutually 
reinforcing, forming a single group in which priority is 
given—in the event there is a difference between one source 
and the other—to a pro homine interpretation, that is, in 
favour of the one that recognizes a broader scope for the 
rights.10  
In other monist countries, such as Guatemala and Ecuador, 
international human rights treaties have a legal status below the 
Constitution but above all other national legislation.11   
As an example, since its adoption in 1989, ILO [International 
Labour Organization] Convention No. 169 on Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples has been used as a tool for interpretation or as a basis for 
decisions by domestic and regional courts throughout Latin America. 
The Convention is invoked in a variety of cases:  
[I]t is used in claims of unconstitutionality, actions for the 
protection of constitutional rights (acción de amparo), 
actions for legal protection (tutela), in disputes between 
authorities, electoral disputes, actions for nullity in 
administrative legal proceedings, regular civil actions 
(where property or displacement is an issue, for example), 
criminal proceedings and actions on agrarian matters, 
among others. In some countries—like Colombia and 
Guatemala—certain qualified persons are allowed to request 
 
 9. Verónica Undurraga & Rebecca J. Cook, Constitutional Incorporation of 
International and Comparative Human Rights Law: The Colombian Constitutional 
Court Decision C-355/2006, in CONSTITUTING EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALITY AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW 229 (Susan H. Williams ed., 2009). 
 10. International Labour Organization, Application of Convention No. 169 by 
Domestic and International Courts in Latin America: A Casebook, at 11 (2009), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/ 
documents/publication/wcms_123946.pdf. 
 11. Id. at 11–12.  
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an opinion on the compatibility of the Constitution with a 
treaty or other legal norms from the court that has been 
assigned control over constitutionality.12  
In contrast, States that follow the dualist tradition do not 
recognize international law unless it has been incorporated, e.g., 
through separate implementing legislation, into the national law. It is 
only applicable ―as‖ national law. Examples of dualist countries 
include the United States, the United Kingdom, and Iraq.13   
International law such as unratified treaties or ratified treaties 
that have not been incorporated can, however, be invoked to identify 
rules of international customary law or general principles of law.14 
This has been a matter of significant debate among the Justices of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, some of whom have referred to international 
law and foreign law to consider the normative weight of certain 
practices, for example with respect to the death penalty.15 Clinics 
have played a role, in many cases, in supporting this trend by 
submitting amicus briefs describing the status of international human 
rights law and the widespread practice of States.16 
 
 12. Id. at 12. 
 13. Regarding Iraq, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 
SOURCES SUBJECTS, AND CONTENTS 99 (3d ed. 2008). This is a greatly simplified 
treatment. In the United States, for example, treaties may be self-executing or non-
self-executing, reflecting the Constitution‘s Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 
VI, § 2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN U.S. RELATIONS LAW § 111(3)–(4) 
(1987).  
 14. International Labour Organization, supra note 10.  
 15. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316–17 n.21 (2002) (―Moreover, 
within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes 
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.‖); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567, 576, 602 (2005) (noting execution of 
juvenile offenders violates several international treaties, including the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and stating that the overwhelming weight of international opinion 
against the juvenile death penalty provides confirmation for the Court‘s own 
conclusion that the death penalty is disproportional punishment for offenders under 
the age of eighteen); see also Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor, Keynote Address 
Before the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 348 (2002); Austen L. 
Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 637 (2007). 
 16. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576 (citing Brief for European Union et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-
633); Brief for President James Earl Carter, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for 
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As an example of the relevance of this issue of the legality of 
international law in the domestic legal order, consider the 
harmonization requirement of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). In accordance with Article 88, all States party 
to the ICC must make their laws consistent with the Statute. This may 
be a fait accompli upon ratification, or it may take significant 
negotiation in a country like France, which ratified the Statute, but 
where implementation has been more complicated.17 The attitude of 
the U.S. government towards international treaties is another case in 
point. This country ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1994 but has yet to adopt implementing 
legislation.18 This means that while the ICCPR constitutes part of 
U.S. law, individuals have no right of action to its protection in the 
United States.  
International human rights and other public interest or social 
justice clinics in monist countries find common ground, as the legal 
 
Former U.S. Diplomats Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); Brief for 
Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633)). 
Among the clinics involved in amicus submissions in support of the Respondent 
were: American University Washington College of Law, International Human 
Rights Law Clinic, under the supervision of Professor Richard J. Wilson (Brief for 
the European Union et al.); the University of San Francisco School of Law, under 
the supervision of Professor Constance De La Vega (Brief for the Human Rights 
Committee of the Bar of England and Wales et al.); Yale Law School, Allard K. 
Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, under the supervision of Professors 
James Silk and Mary Hahn (Brief of Amici Curiae for Former U.S. Diplomats); 
Northwestern University School of Law, Bluhm Legal Clinic, under the 
supervision of Professor Thomas F. Geraghty (Brief of Amici Curiae for President 
James Earl Carter, Jr. et al.). 
 17. Int‘l Justice Tribune, Europe Supports the ICC Without Fail and Without 
Zeal, RADIO NETHERLANDS WORLDWIDE (May 20, 2007), http://www.rnw.nl/ 
international-justice/article/europe-supports-icc-without-fail-and-without-zeal. 
―Although 16 EU countries have harmonized their penal codes with the Rome 
Statute, many other states are making no headway in that direction. For example, 
France still has not voted on incorporating the Rome Statute into domestic law—
seven years after having ratified the Statute.‖ Id.; see also International Criminal 
Court: Rome Statute Implementation Report Card, AMNESTY INT‘L (May 1, 2010), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR53/011/2010/en.  
 18. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ratified by the United States on June 8, 1992). 
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bases of their work plainly converge.19 In the United States, of 
course, the reliance on international law is far more challenging and 
contentious. Not only are we limited in the ways we can invoke 
human rights law as a basis for protecting individuals but also 
exceptionalism and xenophobia in the United States make it 
pedagogically, if not strategically, important to understand the scope 
and applicability of international human rights law. 
Ironically, resistance to international law in the U.S. domestic 
legal system can sometimes authenticate its target. In November 
2010, Oklahoma voters overwhelmingly passed an amendment to the 
state Constitution that would forbid Oklahoma courts from 
considering or relying on international law, Shari‘a Law, or the ―legal 
precepts of other nations or cultures.‖20  It was challenged not on the 
basis of international law but on the basis of individual constitutional 
rights.  
Muneer Awad, Executive Director of the Council on American-
Islamic Relations Oklahoma chapter (CAIR-OK), filed a lawsuit 
alleging that the constitutional amendment violates the First 
Amendment‘s Establishment Clause. On November 8, U.S. District 
Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange granted a temporary restraining order 
blocking certification of the ballot measure by the Oklahoma State 
Board of Elections.21 Upholding the restriction by preliminary 
 
 19. See generally Nicolás Espejo Yaksic, Clinical Legal Education in Latin 
America (Nov. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Maryland Journal 
of International Law). 
 20. The measure passed with seventy percent of the vote. Barbara Hoberock, 
Order Blocks Oklahoma Constitutional Amendment, TULSA WORLD (Nov. 8, 
2010), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=14&articleid=2010 
1108_11_0_OKLAHO357431; Oklahoma State Questions for General Election 
Nov. 2, 2010 - State Question No. 755, OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD. (Aug. 2010), 
http://www.ok.gov/elections/documents/sq_gen10.pdf; Enrolled House Joint 
Resolution 1056 Enacted by the Second Regular Session of the 52nd Legislature of 
the State of Oklahoma Numbered by the Secretary of State: State Question Number 
755, Legislative Referendum Number 355 (May 25, 2010), https://www.sos.ok.gov/ 
documents/questions/755.pdf (discussing Oklahoma State Constitution amendment 
section 1(c), known as the ―Save Our State Amendment‖). 
 21. Hoberock, supra note 20. Awad‘s claim linked Shari‘a and constitutional 
rights: the Oklahoma court would be unable to probate his last will and testament 
because it would be required to consider Shari‘a Law. Awad v. Ziriax, No. CIV-10-
1186-M, 2010 WL 4814077, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 29, 2010). The Court was 
persuaded by his argument that Shari‘a Law ―lacks a legal character,‖ being rather 
―religious traditions that provide guidance to [him] and other Muslims regarding 
the exercise of their faith.‖ Id. 
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injunction on November 29, Judge Miles-LaGrange made a rights-
based argument: 
This order addresses issues that go to the very foundation of 
our country, our [U.S.] Constitution, and particularly, the 
Bill of Rights. Throughout the course of our country‘s 
history, the will of the ―majority‖ has on occasion conflicted 
with the constitutional rights of individuals, an occurrence 
which our founders foresaw and provided for through the 
Bill of Rights. . . . As the United States Supreme Court has 
stated, ―One‘s right to life, liberty, and property, to free 
speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and 
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they 
depend on the outcome of no elections.‖22 
Both the lawsuit and the court avoided any real discussion of the 
prohibitions on international law and laws of other nations or the 
difference between the two. Others address these key issues, 
however. Professors Martha Davis and Johanna Kalb note that ―[t]he 
Oklahoma initiative is just the latest in a series of federal and state 
legislative efforts to prohibit judicial citation of foreign and 
international law. [What is more, r]eligion is associated with 
international law in many of these proposals.‖23 Professors Davis and 
Kalb go on to discuss that 
[W]hat the proponents of the amendment fail to 
acknowledge, however, is that it is impossible to bar judicial 
―consideration‖ of any source—particularly when, as 
described above, international law is relevant to the dispute. 
If anything, the amendment forces judges and justices to be 
less transparent in their reasoning or (if they try to abide by 
the strict letter of the provision) to reach incorrect 
decisions.24 
Davis, Kalb, and others call attention to the federalist 
implications of Oklahoma‘s action, and they warn that such 
isolationist measures may have severe consequences for the 
―government‘s capacity to protect American citizens and businesses 
 
 22. Awad, 2010 WL 4814077, at *1 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).  
 23.  Martha F. Davis & Johanna Kalb, Issue Brief: Oklahoma State Question 
755 and an Analysis of Anti-International Law Initiatives, AM. CONST. SOC‘Y L. & 
POL‘Y 1, 1, 3 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.acslaw.org/node/18016. 
 24.  Id. at 11.  
HURWITZ 9/25/2011  1:40 PM 
2011] TEACHING TO THE PARADOXES 27 
on the international stage‖ which is ―directly related to its ability to 
guarantee our nation‘s reciprocal compliance.‖25 
While the Oklahoma ballot initiative and its aftermath were 
percolating, a related but potentially contradictory process was 
underway with the federal government at the UN Human Rights 
Council. Led by a high level State Department delegation, the United 
States was going through the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of its 
obligations and human rights record.26 Responding to the 
recommendations of the UN Human Rights Council, State 
Department Legal Advisor Harold Hongju Koh acknowledged the 
broad concerns over U.S. domestic implementation of human rights. 
Koh stated,  
[B]ecause we take this process seriously, we now plan to 
conduct a considered, interagency examination of all 228 
recommendations, and to give our formal response at the 
March 2011 Council session . . . . We believe the best 
human rights implementation combines overlapping 
enforcement by all branches of the federal government 
working together with state and local partners.27 
 
 25.  Id.  ―Oklahoma‘s action threatens our national commitment to honoring our 
international obligations and undermines the states‘ ability to work cooperatively 
with the federal government to implement them.‖ Id. A report by the New York 
City Bar Association similarly concluded that:  
The Question‘s prohibition against consideration of ―international law‖ 
will confuse and complicate legal matters in Oklahoma for all those whose 
personal and business affairs relate to international affairs or matters in 
other countries. And in our globally connected world, many of us have 
foreign and international involvements we are unaware of, including the 
entity that owns our own business or holds our mortgage. No state should 
so isolate its entire population, and denigrate a segment of its population 
that is entitled to the full protection of U.S. and State law. 
NYC BAR ASS‘N COMM. ON COMPARATIVE & FOREIGN LAW, THE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF OKLAHOMA REFERENDUM 755—THE ―SAVE OUR 
STATE AMENDMENT‖ 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.nycbar.org/Publications/ 
reports/reportsbycom.php?com=62. 
 26. See Universal Periodic Review, OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. 
RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/uprmain.aspx (last visited Mar. 
21, 2011); Universal Periodic Review Process, U.S. DEP‘T ST., 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/upr/process/index.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).  
 27. Eileen Chamberlain Donahoe & Harold Hongju Koh, United States 
Response to UN HRC Recommendations, U.S. MISSION (Nov. 9, 2010), 
http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/11/09/un-hrc-recommendations/. 
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A broad-based national human rights campaign was coordinated 
by Professor Sarah Paoletti, director of the University of 
Pennsylvania School of Law Transnational Legal Clinic, who served 
as Senior Coordinator for the U.S. Human Rights Network UPR 
Project.28 According to Professor Paoletti, involving her Clinic 
students in the process was more difficult than she anticipated: ―I had 
students coordinate and draft the migrant labor stakeholder report, 
and I brought two students with me to Geneva in November, but their 
ability to contribute to the broader advocacy efforts was more limited 
than I had hoped.‖ 29 She attributed this in part to the demands of the 
Clinic‘s other activities (including an immigration docket). Then too, 
―there is such a learning curve with respect to substance, process, 
goals, and human rights advocacy more generally—especially in the 
one semester context.‖30 
With a year-long Human Rights Clinic and two supervising 
attorneys on the Human Rights in the U.S. Project, Columbia Law 
School students were significantly engaged in the UPR 
process.31 Although they did not attend the review in Geneva, 
Columbia‘s Human Rights Clinic students were involved in the 
report-writing phase, the lobbying of countries to advise them on key 
issues to pursue in questioning the U.S. delegation, and in the follow-
up with the Administration. Clinic students contributed background 
memos for a joint report on treaty ratification (coordinated with 
members of the Bringing Human Rights Home treaty ratification 
working group) and related fact sheets for lobbying.32 They 
 
 28. See, e.g., Universal Periodic Review Project, U.S. HUM. RTS. NETWORK, 
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/campaign_upr (last visited Mar. 21, 2011); 
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: NATIONAL 
REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Aug. 2010), available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
2010/11/UPR-USA.pdf; Risa E. Kaufman, Human Rights Abroad—and at Home, 
POLITICO (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/44881.html. 
 29. E-mail from Sarah Paoletti, Assoc. Professor of Law, Dir. Transnational 
Legal Clinic, Univ. of Penn. Sch. of Law, to author (Feb. 17, 2011) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Paoletti]; Albany Chapter, Local Council for Latin Am. 
Advancement et al., Submission to the United Nations Universal Periodic Review: 
Migrant Labor Rights (2010), http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/default/files/ 
declaration-treaty/Migrant%20Labor%20Joint%20Report%20USA.pdf.  
 30. Paoletti, supra note 29. 
 31. Human Rights Clinic, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/ 
focusareas/clinics/humanrights (last visited Mar. 21, 2011). 
 32. The Bringing Human Rights Home Network is a program of Columbia Law 
School‘s Human Rights Institute, the institutional umbrella that also includes the 
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conducted outreach to country missions, attended lobbying meetings 
at the United Nations in New York, and drafted recommendations for 
countries that were being lobbied, based upon their review of past 
UPR sessions. Students also researched and drafted a memo to the 
U.S. State Department on UPR implementation efforts of other 
countries. Columbia Law School‘s Clinic students remain engaged in 
UPR follow-up, focusing on raising awareness of the UPR at the state 
and local level, and are currently drafting a UPR implementation 
toolkit for state and local human rights commissions.33 
Still, when the UPR ―campaign‖ is over and the time comes for 
the Administration to act on the recommendations, how will the 
Administration come to terms with the views that lead to the 
Oklahoma and other States‘ isolationist initiatives?   
IV.  LAWYERING IN THE VOID: ―RIGHTS WITHOUT REMEDIES, DUTIES 
WITHOUT JURISDICTIONS‖?34  
The Symposium coordinators invited panelists to consider blind 
spots and weaknesses in the pedagogy and practice of international 
human rights clinics. Among the most fundamental and persistent 
would have to be the dilemma of human rights enforcement and the 
related challenge of measuring States‘ accountability. ―A feature of 
lawyering is its commitment to instrumentalism, and success is 
understood as the [achievement] of a favorable legal result.‖35 With 
international human rights law, favorable results appear protracted, if 
not elusive. Yet, the absence of an immediate remedy renders the 
right no less valid or fundamental. One of the fathers of modern 
international law, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, distinguished the 
instrumental (rules) from the intrinsic (principles): 
[One must not] exaggerate the importance of what is, in the 
last resort, a procedural rule. The faculty to enforce rights is 
 
Human Rights Clinic. Bringing Human Rights Home Lawyers’ Network, COLUM. 
L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/human_rights/HRinUS/BH 
RH_Law_Net (last visited Mar. 21, 2011); Treaty Ratification, U.S. HUM. RTS. 
NETWORK, http://www.ushrnetwork.org/content/papersdocuments/treatyratification 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2011).  
 33. E-mail from JoAnn Kamuf Ward, Counsel, Human Rights in the U.S. 
Project, Columbia Law Sch., to author (Mar. 9, 2011) (on file with author). Clinic 
students were involved in the project in academic years 2009 and 2010. Id.  
 34. Subheader borrowed from ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS 
OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 74 (2006). 
 35. Mosher, supra note 2, at 617. 
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not identical with the quality of a subject of law or of a 
beneficiary of its provisions. A person may be in possession 
of a plenitude of rights without at the same time being able 
to enforce them in his own name. This is a matter of 
procedural capacity. Infants and lunatics have rights; they 
are subjects of law. This is so although their procedural 
capacity is reduced to a minimum. Secondly, the rule 
preventing individuals from enforcing their rights before 
international tribunals is a piece of international machinery 
adapted for convenience. It is not a fundamental principle.36  
The distinction and relationship between procedural rules and 
fundamental principles are critical to international human rights 
lawyering. They form part of the domain of international clinics, 
whose work involves discovering ways to hold States and non-State 
actors accountable where such mechanisms are deficient or altogether 
absent. Consider gender-based violence in Haiti. A host of NGOs and 
law school clinics have been documenting the problem and calling 
the government to account for the serious violations against women 
and girls in the post-earthquake displaced person camps.37 The 
Government of Haiti has clear obligations, as a party to the 
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW),38 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD),39 the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
 36. Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law: Being the Collected Papers of 
Hersch Lauterpacht, in THE GENERAL WORKS 286–87 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1970).  
 37. These include New York University Global Justice Clinic, City University 
of New York International Women‘s Human Rights Clinic, University of Virginia 
International Human Rights Law Clinic, University of Miami Human Rights Law 
Clinic, Yale International Human Rights Law Clinic, University of Pennsylvania 
Transnational Legal Clinic, and University of Minnesota Law School International 
Litigation and Advocacy Clinic, among others.  
 38. Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. Haiti ratified the Convention on July 20, 1981. 
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. 
TREATY COLLECTION (Apr. 1, 2011), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails. 
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en.  
 39. Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: 
Monitoring Racial Equality and Non-discrimination, OFF. U.N. HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/ (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2011). CERD monitors implementation of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for 
signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195. Haiti 
ratified the Convention on Dec. 19, 1972. International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION 
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(CRC),40 the ICCPR, and the Inter-American Convention on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women (Belém do Para).41 What is 
more, Haiti has a monist system. According to the Haitian 
Constitution, Article 276-2,42 upon approval and ratification, 
international treaties become part of domestic law and abrogate any 
conflicting laws.43 
Considering Haiti‘s legal, economic, and political devastation, 
dysfunction, and corruption—which predate the January 2010 
earthquake—the options for progressive realization of rights are 
grim. In his clever litany of ―50 Ways International Law Hurts Our 
Lives,‖ Professor José Alvarez includes the ―privileging of 
globalization over human rights.‖44 Haiti exemplifies the dilemma of 
poor nations that find themselves in the untenable position of having 
to choose between making good on their international law obligations 
and repaying their loans (never mind that Haiti has not ratified the 
 
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY& 
mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en.  
 40. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. Haiti 
ratified the Convention on June 8, 1995. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (Apr. 1, 2011), http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails. 
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en.  
 41. Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication 
of Violence Against Women, opened for signature June 6, 1994, available at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-61.html. Haiti ratified the Convention on 
April 7, 1997. Id. 
 42. HAITI CONST. art. 276-2, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 
3ae6b542c.html. 
 43. INST. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY IN HAITI ET AL., OUR BODIES ARE STILL 
TREMBLING: HAITIAN WOMEN‘S FIGHT AGAINST RAPE 24 (July 2010), available at 
http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Haiti-GBV-Report-Final-
Compressed.pdf. 
 44. José E. Alvarez & David Lachman, International Law: 50 Ways It Hurts 
Our Lives, AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. 1, 16 (2010), available at http://www.asil.org/ 
ilpost/president/50_ways.pdf.  
Privileging globalization over human rights. Poor governments are faced 
with a Hobson‘s choice between honoring the demands of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) or complying with the commands of international economic 
institutions. If they violate human rights, governments may face 
complaints or international investigation. By contrast, the World Bank and 
IMF can cut off aid, reducing the resources that governments have 
available to fulfill the economic human rights of their people. 
See José E. Alvarez, The Future of Our Society: The 2007 Presidential Address of 
the 101st Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 102 AM. 
SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 499 (2008).  
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). 
Fortunately for Haiti, NGOs, international organizations, and inter-
governmental organizations have stepped up to fill the gap. This 
humanitarian assistance, however, does not relieve the Haitian 
Government of its obligations. In fact, it raises an important corollary 
question: What (if any) human rights obligations do state and non-
state third party actors assume when they intervene for development 
or humanitarian purposes in post-conflict and post-disaster 
contexts?45 
In the last panel of the Re-imagining International Clinical Law 
Symposium,46 Professor Barbara Olshansky noted one of the 
fundamental principles of international human rights law—there are 
no legal vacuums.47 No individual is ever without rights, no matter 
what the State does or does not do, no matter where the person is, or 
what she has done or said or proffered.48  That is a powerful starting 
point.  
The idea that there are no legal vacuums is especially relevant in 
countries that follow the dualist legal tradition, like the United States. 
The fact that the U.S. government has not ratified the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights (ICESCR),49 for 
example, does not mean that Americans have a lesser claim to the 
right to health or housing than, say, Colombians or Canadians, whose 
governments have ratified the ICESCR.50 ―Once the procedural 
international remedy is granted [or undertaken] by the state, the right 
becomes more effective, but the remedy does not generate the 
right.‖51 
 
 45.  See, e.g., Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Indicators in Crisis: Rights-Based 
Humanitarian Indicators in Post-Earthquake Haiti, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 
(forthcoming 2011).  
 46. The last panel was entitled International Clinical Law: Theory and Critique.  
 47. Barbara Olshansky, Remarks at the University of Maryland School of Law 
Symposium: Re-imagining International Clinical Law (Nov. 18, 2010) (recording 
on file with the University of Maryland School of Law). 
 48. Id. 
 49. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].  
 50. Colombia ratified it on Oct. 29, 1969, and Canada acceded to it on May 19, 
1976. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. 
TREATY COLLECTION (Apr. 1, 2011), http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails. 
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en. The United States 
signed the ICESCR on Oct. 5, 1977 but has not yet ratified it. Id.  
 51. CLAPHAM, supra note 34.  
HURWITZ 9/25/2011  1:40 PM 
2011] TEACHING TO THE PARADOXES 33 
Just as individuals are rights-holders even in the absence of 
procedural jurisdiction, so are States generally duty-bearers in many 
an apparent void. It is hard enough to assess and monitor States‘ 
compliance with their obligations when they have expressly agreed to 
be held accountable through treaty ratification. How do we measure 
accountability in those all-too-frequent situations where States fail to 
fulfill their duties or refuse to be bound by universal human rights 
law and principles? Human rights scholars and advocates are 
responding to the enforcement challenge by developing more 
systematic methods of evaluating the impact of our work and 
measuring the extent to which States fulfill their human rights 
commitments.52 The heightened use of rights-based indicators is one 
concrete response to demands for quality and accountability.  
V.  REVOLUTION OR PARADOX? BALANCING QUANTITATIVE AND 
QUALITATIVE APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS ACCOUNTABILITY 
In 2005, Michael Ignatieff and Kate Desormeau noted that a 
measurement revolution has been underway in the fields of 
development and governance. By measurement revolution, 
they meant the exponential diffusion and rising influence of 
standardized and quantifiable measures of performance in 
international public policy. Yet, they noted that as this 
quantitative revolution has spread—increasingly measuring 
all aspects of human wellbeing, changing the way 
international organizations monitor governments‘ behavior, 
and the way governments assess each other and target their 
aid and development policies—the human rights movement 
has stood aside.53 
Traditional economic and social science indicators rely on 
quantitative data but reveal little about the qualitative aspects or 
context in which they operate. Anchored in human rights treaty 
standards and general comments of the monitoring committees, in 
particular the ICESCR,54 rights-based indicators evaluate in a 
contextually relevant manner the extent to which States respect, 
 
 52. AnnJanette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicators: 
Measuring Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 253, 256–57 (2009). 
 53. Eitan Felner, A New Frontier in Economic and Social Rights Advocacy? 
Turning Quantitative Data into a Tool for Human Rights Advocacy, 9 SUR – INT‘L 
J. HUM. RTS. 109, 134 (2008). 
 54. ICESCR, supra note 49.  
HURWITZ 9/25/2011  1:40 PM 
34           MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 26:18 
protect, and fulfill their human rights obligations.55 They place 
marginalized groups at the core of the approach, along with the 
transversal rights issues of non-discrimination and equality, 
participation, and accountability.56 For example,  
[W]hile traditional development indicators evaluate 
education as a basic human need to be checked against 
development goals, right to education indicators aim to 
measure the extent to which States fulfill their legal human 
rights obligations. In addition, development indicators may 
tend to regard marginalised groups as recipients of aid, 
rather than rights holders per se. . . . Rights-based 
indicators, on the other hand, aim to assess the conformity 
of education with human rights standards, by focusing on 
what goes on in and outside the classroom. For instance, 
they question the suitability of the infrastructure, learning 
material, teaching methodology, but also consider 
children‘s socio-cultural characteristics, interaction, 
distribution, learning outcomes, and opportunities for 
stakeholders‘ participation. In other words, right to 
education indicators measure not only the right to education 
but also rights in and through education.57 
Three forms of indicators constitute a framework by which cause 
and effect can be measured, ―reflect[ing] the commitment-effort-
results aspect of the realization of human rights through available 
 
 55. Office of the U.N. High Comm‘r for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report on 
Indicators for Promoting and Monitoring the Implementation of Human Rights, ¶ 5, 
U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2008/3 (June 6, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 U.N. Report on 
Indicators]; see also OHCHR, Report on Indicators for Monitoring Compliance 
with International Human Rights Instruments, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc HRI/MC/2006/7 (May 
11, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 U.N. Report on Indicators for Monitoring 
Compliance]. 
 56. 2008 U.N. Report on Indicators, supra note 55, ¶ 24 (―[F]or all indicators it 
is essential to seek disaggregated data on the human rights situation of vulnerable 
and marginalized population groups vis-à-vis the rest of the population.‖); Gauthier 
de Beco, Right to Education Indicator Based on the 4A Framework 13–19 (Right to 
Educ. Project, Concept Paper, May 2009), available at http://www.right-to-
education.org/sites/r2e.gn.apc.org/files/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20Concept%20 
Paper_final.pdf. 
 57. Beyond Statistics: Measuring Education as a Human Right: A Consultative 
Workshop on Indicators for the Right to Education 1 (The Right to Educ. Project, 
Background Paper, Apr. 19, 2001), available at http://www.right-to-
education.org/sites/r2e.gn.apc.org/files/Background_paper.pdf. 
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quantifiable information.‖58 Structural indicators monitor how well 
the State‘s laws reflect, incorporate, and implement its treaty 
obligations. Process indicators account for what mechanisms the 
State has created to implement its existing laws toward the realization 
of the right. They capture the cause element of a cause-and-effect 
relationship. Outcome indicators measure the reality on the ground—
the effect element, to what extent the population has access to and 
enjoys a particular right.   
Structural indicators include the existence (or nonexistence) 
of constitutional provisions, case law precedent, and/or 
national legislation providing free and compulsory primary 
education for all, as mandated by international human rights 
law. 
 
Process indicators include the existence (or nonexistence) of 
regulations permitting charges/fees in primary and 
secondary schools for enrollment, tuition, uniforms, school 
supplies, school meals, and school transport. 
 
Outcome indicators, disaggregated by rural/urban, income, 
gender, and ethnicity, include: the proportion of all children 
who have to pay for primary education and, for these 
families, the average expenditure for education (direct costs 
and some indirect costs, like compulsory levies–even when 
portrayed as voluntary—on parents, and relatively 
expensive uniforms).59  
While it may not be a groundswell, human rights advocates have 
not been entirely oblivious to the quantitative ―revolution.‖ Some 
human rights clinics have been using quantitative methodology in 
their project work for some time. The International Human Rights 
 
 58. Rosga & Satterthwaite, supra note 52, at 296 (citing Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Physical and Mental Health, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/48 (Mar. 3, 
2006) (by Paul Hunt)). 
 59. Sital Kalantry et al., Enhancing Enforcement of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights Using Indicators: A Focus on the Right to Education in the 
ICESCR, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 253, 306 tbl.3 (2010). The Cornell International Human 
Rights Clinic, the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights (RFK 
Center), and the University of Virginia International Human Rights Law Clinic 
collaborated to produce a report for a hearing before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. Id. at 253; ROBERT F. KENNEDY CTR. FOR JUSTICE 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, RIGHT TO EDUCATION OF AFRO-DESCENDANTS AND 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN THE AMERICAS: ACHIEVING DIGNITY AND EQUALITY FOR 
ALL (2008), available at http://www.rfkcenter.org/files/20090907_rt2ed_ENG.pdf.  
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Law Clinic at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law, 
under the direction of Professor Laurel Fletcher, has conducted 
empirical studies of the human rights impacts of Hurricane Katrina, 
the 2004 tsunami, and forced labor in the United States, among other 
projects.60   
Professor Margaret Satterthwaite, director of NYU Law School‘s 
Global Justice Clinic and a leading scholar in the field of human 
rights indicators, has produced several reports with her students that 
successfully combine the quantitative and qualitative approaches in 
assessing stakeholder responsibility for rights violations in Haiti.61 
While Professor Satterthwaite is a proponent of rights-based 
indicators, she is conscious of the challenges and contradictions of 
the quantitative methodology.62 On the one hand, the ―trust in 
indicators‖ can be understood as a way to authenticate the ―troubled‖ 
authority of human rights mechanisms,  
[G]iven the longstanding and unresolved issue of the status 
of the treaty bodies—and thus of their assessments—in 
international law. Indeed, the turn toward mechanics of 
measurement and notions of scientific objectivity may 
appear to offer a kind of authority that the treaty bodies 
 
 60. FREE THE SLAVES & THE HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, 
HIDDEN SLAVES: FORCED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (2004), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/hiddenslaves_report.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., 
UNIV. OF CAL, BERKELEY & E.-W. CTR., AFTER THE TSUNAMI: HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
VULNERABLE POPULATIONS (2005), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/ 
HRCweb/pdfs/tsunami_full.pdf; INT‘L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, BOALT HALL 
SCH. OF LAW ET AL., REBUILDING AFTER KATRINA: A POPULATION-BASED STUDY 
OF LABOR AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NEW ORLEANS (2006), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/HRCweb/pdfs/report_katrina.pdf; INT‘L HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, SCH. OF LAW ET AL., IN THE 
CHILD‘S BEST INTEREST?  THE CONSEQUENCES OF LOSING A LAWFUL IMMIGRANT 
PARENT TO DEPORTATION (2010), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/ 
files/IHRLC/In_the_Childs_Best_Interest.pdf. 
 61. Jointly, the New York University School of Law Center for Human Rights 
and Global Justice, Partners in Health, RFK Center for Justice & Human Rights, 
and Zanmi Lasante have published the following reports: SAK VID PA KANPE: THE 
IMPACT OF U.S. FOOD AID ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI (2010), available at 
http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/sakvidpakanpe.pdf; WÒCH NAN SOLEY: THE 
DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO WATER IN HAITI (2008), available at 
http://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/wochnan soley.pdf. Professor Satterthwaite and 
her clinic students are currently employing a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methodology in a major study of the relationship of the rights to water 
and food and gender-based violence in Haiti. 
 62.  See generally Rosga & Satterthwaite, supra note 52. 
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have never been able to achieve through the ―quasi-judicial 
exercise[s]‖ that make up their core functions.63 
At the same time, Satterthwaite, her co-author, AnnJanette 
Rosga, and others call attention to the intrinsic flaw in efforts to use 
indicators in the context of, for example, UN treaty monitoring, in 
order to imbue the procedures with a kind of technical objectivity.64   
[T]his effort will never solve the problem that generated the 
ICESCR‘s audit practice to begin with: the relationship of 
distrust between the treaty bodies and the States whose 
efforts they monitor. . . . While the conceptual clarity 
concerning the standard of progressive realization is helpful, 
even a pristine level of clarity will never allow a human 
rights professional to assess as a technical matter the 
adequacy of the State‘s measures because adequacy is never 
only a technical question. . . . It requires, instead, the 
exercise of [human] judgment.65   
Human rights advocates, as well as States and UN bodies, must give 
critical thought to tendencies that ―privilege those (generally 
numerical) indicators whose interpretive work is invisible‖ while 
devaluing those indicators that require qualitative, human 
assessment.66 
The pedagogical value to including this discussion in a clinic‘s 
work should be apparent. It allows for evaluative discussion and 
facilitates an interdisciplinary examination of methodology, strategy, 
impact, interpretation, and sustainability. It is beneficial for students 
to be familiar with the general comments of the treaty-monitoring 
bodies, for example, as a source for the qualitative and quantitative 
scope of particular rights.67 
 
 63.  Id. at 289.  
 64.  Id. at 302.  
 65. Id. at 303–04. 
 66. Id. at 285. 
 67. 2006 U.N. Report on Indicators for Monitoring Compliance, supra note 55, 
¶ 9. 
The human rights monitoring mechanisms refer to a wide range of 
indicators (qualitative and quantitative) that are reflected in the human 
rights normative framework comprising the various international 
instruments, their elaborations through general comments, reporting 
guidelines and concluding observations. While some quantitative 
indicators are explicitly quoted in the human rights treaties, the general 
HURWITZ 9/25/2011  1:40 PM 
38           MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 26:18 
Emilie Hafner-Burton and James Ron maintain that the different 
research methods, i.e., quantitative and qualitative, lead to divergent 
conclusions about how to protect human rights.  ―Qualitative and 
quantitative scholars see the same empirical world from different 
vantage points. Case specialists are embedded in the twists and turns 
of local conditions, but statisticians fly high above the landscape, 
focusing only on the broadest of trends. Understandably, these 
different views yield quite different assessments.‖68 
Hafner-Burton and Ron laud the fact that human rights has 
become integral to global culture and the discourse of social change 
in the developing world. ―Rights language has diffused across global 
divides, infusing both Northern and Southern discussions with new 
terms and agendas.‖69 They suggest, however, that ―this global 
network of ‗principled issue‘ actors . . . is engaged in two separate 
campaigns,‖70 sometimes at play simultaneously, sometimes working 
at cross-purposes. One campaign pursues a strategy of moral 
persuasion, focusing on the pragmatism and desirability of universal 
human rights.71 The methodology of this strand favors case studies, 
documentation, and reporting. The other campaign utilizes empirical 
data in an effort ―to translate human rights policies and language into 
lasting reality.‖72 As the two rely on substantially different methods, 
―persistent gaps between rhetorical success and empirical reality‖ 
result.73 In the final analysis, human rights are best protected where 
the two methodologies are employed jointly. Without the voices and 
experiences of those who are impacted by transnational development 
and human rights violations, human rights become dehumanized.74   
 
comments adopted by the treaty bodies specify the type and role of these 
indicators.  
Id.  
 68. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & James Ron, Seeing Double: Human Rights 
Impact through Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes, 61 WORLD POL. 360, 373–74 
(2009). 
 69. Id. at 361. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 362. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Tamara Relis, Human Rights and Southern Realities, 33 HUM. RTS. Q. 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 20), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1592042 (quoting Upendra Baxi, ―individual biographies of the violated must 
feature more prominently in human rights theory. This focus would serve to 
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VI.  THE PARADOX OF PARTNERSHIP75 
Human rights clinics engage with organizations and individuals 
whose cases and strategic objectives they find compelling and 
educational. I refer to these relationships as partnerships,76 and on 
principle, such relationships should be based on transparency, mutual 
respect, empowerment, and accountability. Yet, contradictions 
inherent in clinical legal education can create tensions in the 
relationships due to distance, pedagogical priorities, distinct core 
constituencies, and cultural, linguistic, and educational differences. 
To the extent that IHRL clinics embrace the paradox of partnership as 
a given, they can use it to their pedagogical advantage.   
Global networking has greatly facilitated collaboration with 
distant partners. Students can spend much of the semester working 
from computers in the law school or at home and use Skype™ or the 
telephone for more ―direct‖ contact. At the same time, interacting 
with partners, clients, and communities on the ground is a goal of 
clinical legal education and fundamental to human rights lawyering. 
It imbues the work with authenticity.77 And yet, important as it is, the 
 
respond to questions such as, ‗Does this endless normativity [of human rights] 
perform any useful function in the ‗real world‘? . . .‖).  
 75. Diana Hortsch asserts that responsible advocacy includes looking closely at 
strategic partnerships and how they impact an organization‘s human rights mission. 
See generally Diana Hortsch, The Paradox of Partnership: Amnesty International, 
Responsible Advocacy, and NGO Accountability, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
119 (2010) (framing her analysis with the International NGO Accountability 
Charter). Her article provides a fascinating discussion of a controversial partnership 
between Amnesty International‘s (AI) Counter Terror with Justice campaign and 
former Guantánamo detainee Moazzam Begg, which created an apparently 
irreconcilable conflict with AI‘s Gender, Sexuality and Identity division. Id. at 
136–37, 146–48. The article raises many important issues about transparency and 
NGO accountability in giving voice to rights victims that offer critical insight for 
international clinical legal education. See generally id. I make use of Hortsch‘s title 
to develop the themes in this context. 
 76.  See, e.g., Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and The Inevitability of 
International Human Rights Law Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT‘L L. 505 (2003). While I 
acknowledge that human rights clinics also work on a lawyer-client basis, the 
current article considers primarily the project-based work of clinics. Still, the 
dynamics discussed here can apply as well to the more traditional lawyering 
relationship.  
 77. Fraudulence forestalled? Experiences of war, poverty, and rights violations 
are indirect, ―mediated‖ through projects. Hugo Slim, By What Authority? The 
Legitimacy and Accountability of Non-Governmental Organisations 1, 5 (Int‘l 
Council on Human Rights Policy, Working Paper, 2002), available at 
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threshold question is not how often or for how long students get into 
the field to meet their partners.78 The critical question is the nature of 
the relationship between clinics and their partners, both in person as 
well as through the distance. As Hugo Slim, Diana Hortsch, and 
others effectively assert, human rights lawyering requires an ethics of 
relational accountability.79   
Relational accountability calls into focus those for, with, and on 
whose behalf NGOs and clinics advocate.80 For human rights NGOs, 
the question of core constituency can be answered superficially in 
terms of victims and survivors of human rights violations, individuals 
and communities seeking to develop and strengthen rights respecting 
mechanisms and laws, or even a more ―broad or diffuse constituency 
(for example, advocacy to protect the environment or promote 
general rights awareness).‖81 Relational accountability is as much 
process-orientated as outcome-oriented, if not more so, ensuring that 
beneficiaries participate fully and meaningfully in the work. 
However, as the International Council for Human Rights Policy 
(ICHRP) notes, ―it is important to acknowledge that reality is often 
far more complicated. For instance, access to this core constituency 
may be restricted or limited, as it is for NGOs that work on behalf of 
people who are dead or disappeared; or prisoners; or detainees held in 
secret.‖82 Clinics and NGOs that conduct their work from afar have to 
negotiate the challenges of decision-making under exigent 
circumstances, incomplete or differing strategic conclusions or 
comprehension, and distrust that may have nothing to do with the 
actual partnership but which lurks in the underlying ideological and 
historical context. 
 
http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/65/118_Legitimacy_Accountability_Nongovern
mental_Organisations_Slim_Hugo_2002.pdf. 
 78. Many international human rights clinics make brief field visits—a week or 
two—during the course of the semester. Stanford‘s International Human Rights and 
Development Clinic is designed around a full semester in the field. See 
International Human Rights and Development Clinic, STANFORD L. SCH., 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/clinics/internationalcommunity/ (last visited 
Apr. 12, 2011).  
 79. See generally Slim, supra note 77; Hortsch, supra note 75.  
 80. Int‘l Council On Human Rights, ICHRP Online Discussion Forum on 
Human Rights Principles and NGO Accountability ¶ 29 (Approach Paper), 
available at http://www.ichrp.org/approach_paper.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter ICHRP]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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Competing core constituencies may sow conflicts of interest for 
clinics. For example, though the clinic‘s primary relationship may be 
with the partners in the field, they also have to manage another key 
constituency, namely their academic institution, which enables and 
legitimates the work by funding the clinic and by granting credit to 
students. The clinic‘s status and viability may depend on being able 
to publicize its fieldwork, which has a commodifying effect on the 
partnership and may not be in the partner‘s interest. 
Writing for the ICHRP, Hugo Slim has noted how the credibility 
and legitimacy of NGOs has expanded the notion of international 
non-governmental organization (INGO) accountability, which has an 
impact in selecting partners. INGOs demonstrate their credibility and 
legitimacy by meeting two main requirements: they have to justify 
the voice with which they speak and prove the effectiveness of what 
they are doing.83 NGOs and individuals in the ―global south‖ learn 
that they have a say in deciding with whom they work. 
Voice accountability requires justifying what an organization is 
saying (questions of veracity—can you prove it?), how it is saying it 
(questions of authority—from where do we derive the power to 
speak?), and what relationship exists with the people on whose behalf 
we are advocating (are we speaking as stakeholders, with them, for 
them, or about them?).84 As a corollary, voice accountability also 
implies ―refraining from speech so that others may be heard,‖85 i.e., 
the human rights principle that places the person on the ground at the 
center of the advocacy. 
At times this seems to pit conventional rules of professional 
responsibility, such as zealous advocacy, against the principle of 
empowering the partner/client (although of course, this problem is 
not unique to human rights lawyering). 
The question of partnership is more than simply a question 
of process, however. There is a paradox at the heart of 
partnership for human rights lawyering and advocacy. Two 
important values can at times be in tension: the goal of 
empowering clients, partners and communities and the goal 
of guarding and advancing the universalism of human 
rights.86  
 
 83. Slim, supra note 77, at 3.  
 84. Id. at 3, 6. 
 85. Hortsch, supra note 75, at 147–48, 151. 
 86. Id. at 148–49. 
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The principle of ―simply being ‗silent so that others may speak‘ 
is not always sufficient to protect and advance human rights in the 
context of organizational partnerships.‖87 My Clinic offered to 
collaborate with an indigenous Latin American NGO88 to support its 
work against a North American corporation involved in the extractive 
industry. The NGO had participated in an intensive strategic human 
rights litigation workshop, and people I trusted had recommended it. 
Within a very short time, however, it became clear that the endeavor 
was fraught because of communication problems in translation—
language as well as expectation. The Clinic students and I worked 
hard at being conscious of the power dynamics and respectful of our 
partner‘s sensitivity with regard to making strategic decisions. The 
NGO‘s legal representative was preparing for an important hearing at 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, but he seemed to 
lack basic knowledge about the proceeding. We felt that we had 
experience that would be helpful to him; however, he was not open to 
our suggestions. Members of a coalition were involved, and he was 
effectively coordinating the delegation, so we figured things would 
work out before the hearing. So we kept silent. 
There were five indigenous representatives prepared to speak at 
the Inter-American Commission hearing in their allotted half hour; 
our partner was to go last. We expected his presentation to be longer 
than ten minutes. The first person to speak, however, delivered his 
comments in his local indigenous language, for which there was no 
translator, and he spoke for more than fifteen minutes. Needless to 
say, our partner never even got a chance to speak, and the hearing 
was a disaster. The Commissioners got nothing from the indigenous 
representatives during that session, and an important opportunity to 
address their government was squandered. 
It was, as we say in clinical legal education, a ―teachable 
moment‖ (for my students at least). We discussed the situation at 
length, and the students wrote an incisive end-of-semester memo 
from which I quote: 
One of the central takeaway lessons from the project is that 
international human rights law is as much an exercise in 
 
 87. Id. at 155. 
 88. For confidentiality reasons, specific identifying information is omitted. For 
information on the rights of indigenous peoples regarding extractive industry 
projects, see Margaret Satterthwaite & Deena Hurwitz, The Right of Indigenous 
Peoples to Meaningful Consent in Extractive Industry Projects, 22 ARIZ. J. INT‘L & 
COMP. L. 1 (2005). 
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organizational politics as [it is about] the law as classically 
conceived. Our initial impression of this project was that we 
would be working with the ―legal representative‖ of the 
[indigenous] community in advancing their case . . . before 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR). From an American perspective, this would seem 
to be a straightforward task: one group of lawyers, working 
with a partner organization, on behalf of their clients in 
preparation for litigation before an established tribunal. In 
the international context, this dynamic is far more 
complicated than this conception reveals. We encountered a 
number of difficulties ranging from the obvious and 
concrete—for example, the language barrier—to the more 
complex and abstract—for example, our role as a clinic in a 
highly politicized, uncertain strategic litigation case 
involving multiple actors. 
 
The cultural barrier was also evident when the 
representative from [the community] spoke in his local 
dialect during the IACHR hearing. A part of us 
acknowledged the [political nature of this act]—that he 
represented a unique living people and culture. At the same 
time, a part of us was frustrated that he was wasting [very 
limited] time speaking in a language that no one understood. 
From our perspective, the goal of a hearing before a tribunal 
is to present legal arguments. When dealing with a 
historically disenfranchised community, however, there is 
another objective: giving that community a voice that it has 
traditionally been denied. There is a tension between these 
objectives.  
 
Presenting the best legal case may require taking control of 
the party‘s message and the presentation thereof, while 
giving a disenfranchised community a voice in the 
international sphere requires [us] to step back and allow the 
community to express itself without extraneous interference. 
Clinic students operating in the international context should 
be aware of this potential tension and the need to balance 
legal advocacy with indigenous empowerment. 
 
Our distance, both physically and culturally, from [the 
country] and the [indigenous] communities meant that we 
never got a good grasp on the politics and tensions 
underlying the case. [One of the communities] distrusts 
international NGOs, does not trust the municipal officials 
purporting to represent the community, and does not have 
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confidence in our partner‘s capacity to handle his role as 
legal representative. Our partner, in turn, does not trust [the 
U.S. based NGO that has a proven track record on these 
issues in many countries and before regional and 
international tribunals]. Compounding these internal 
conflicts, there are questions as to the degree the municipal 
officials in each community actually reflect the will of the 
community . . . .  
 
We were aware that these many layers of conflict and 
distrust underlay the case, but our understanding of them 
was superficial and largely based on hearsay. The fact that 
the case involved so many uncertainties and tensions made 
us [the students] uncomfortable. We did not want to 
inadvertently compromise ourselves or the Law School by 
getting in the middle of conflicts that we did not fully 
understand.89   
In retrospect, it might have been an even better teaching moment 
had we explored the dimensions of accountability. The students were 
fairly disillusioned with the partner and the project, and I could not 
blame them. It was difficult to arouse in them a sense of 
accountability to the partnership, in no small part because we had not 
met the legal representative before the day of the hearing, and never 
visited the communities or even traveled to the country. Of course, 
that lack of relational accountability90 was mutual.   
A relatively new initiative has created an International Non-
Governmental Organizations Accountability Charter (INGO 
Accountability Charter) around the issues of civil society legitimacy, 
 
 89. Memorandum from Clare Boronow (‘12), Rajat Rana (LL.M, ‘10), and Gary 
Lawkowski (‘11), Students, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Int‘l Human Rights Law 
Clinic, to author (Nov. 12, 2010) (on file with author).  
 90. ICHRP, supra note 80, ¶ 25. 
Accountability is arguably best understood in relational terms: it takes 
form in the context of relations between individual, collective, or 
institutional actors. The latter include an NGO‘s core constituency, its 
donors, its staff and volunteers, the state and public authorities, and other 
actors in the public sphere such as other NGOs, the media, etc. In addition, 
NGOs have ―accountability to themselves,‖ in other words to their goals, 
values and mission. All these relationships taken together, related to 
performance or mission, provide a map of an NGO‘s accountability. 
Id.    
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accountability, and transparency.91 The Charter exists in the context 
of a movement that seeks to articulate how ―human rights values, 
principles and standards change or influence discussion and 
understanding of NGO accountability . . . [and] the relationship 
between human rights principles on one hand, and the various ways 
in which NGOs think and speak about, and operationalise, 
accountability on the other.‖92 
[T]he exercise of accountability does not occur within a 
normative vacuum. Goals, values, standards, ideals, rules 
and contractual obligations all combine to govern this web 
of relationships. Discussion of an NGO‘s accountability 
must therefore take account of the variety of actors and 
agents with whom it has an accountability relationship of 
some form; the work it does, since its accountability will be 
influenced by its primary mission and field of action; and 
the NGO‘s values, norms and rules—including those that 
underpin its relationships.93 
Considering the fluidity with which human rights lawyering 
moves between the local and global, the developed and sub-
developed, and the formal and informal, the dialogue, deliberation, 
and articulation of common principles and codes of conduct seem 
necessary and extremely valuable. The INGO Accountability Charter 
and its framework can serve as a pedagogical tool for international 
clinics relating to one another as well as to their partners at home and 
abroad. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
―Moral decision making involves more than knowledge of 
relevant rules and principles, it also demands a capacity to understand 
how those rules apply, and which principles are most important in 
concrete settings.‖94   
Though international law will continue to be sovereigntist for a 
long time to come, the human rights-based approach provides a 
 
 91. International NGOs Commitment to Accountability, INGO 
ACCOUNTABILITY CHARTER, http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/ (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2011). 
 92. ICHRP, supra note 80, ¶ 5.  
 93.  Id. ¶ 27.  
 94.  Nigel Duncan & Susan L. Kay, Addressing Lawyer Competence, Ethics, 
and Professionalism, in THE GLOBAL CLINICAL MOVEMENT: EDUCATING LAWYERS 
FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 183,186 (Frank S. Bloch ed., 2011). 
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conceptual framework and a methodology that places individuals and 
communities as rights-holders at the center. Moreover, it requires 
critical analysis of the relationships of stakeholders to one another 
and of the power dynamics at play in the pursuit of justice. 
Critical legal theorists have much to offer international clinical 
legal education. Acknowledging and owning the dark side of human 
rights as well as the ―progressive‖ side, for example, the Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) movement, answers the 
question ―what is to be done‖ differently from traditional 
international lawyers.95 Their objective is not merely to critique or 
reject the human rights ―progress narrative‖ but to constantly 
question what has been achieved, at whose expense, to whose benefit, 
at what price? This is a vital lens for questioning the relationship of 
power in social justice and legal reform. It is a question of whose 
voices are dictating the strategies, and whose are silent. In the words 
of Professor Alvarez, ―the critical mindset is the reform agenda.‖96   
 
 
 
 95. José E. Alvarez, Closing Remarks at the Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL) Conference on The Third World Today: What is to be 
Done? 2, available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv1/groups/public/@nyu 
_law_website__faculty__faculty_profiles__jalvarez/documents/documents/ecm_pr
o_066870.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2011); see also Makau W. Mutua, What is 
TWAIL?, AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L.PROC. 31–39 (2000), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1533471. 
 96. Alvarez, supra note 95, at 7.  
